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Liquidation games with constraints

  • 演讲者:傅冠兴(香港理工大学)

  • 时间:2026-05-27 15:00-16:00

  • 地点:理学院大楼 M4009

Abstract
Since liquidity competition may generate beneficial round trips, an effect that can be interpreted as a form of arbitrage and should therefore be ruled out, we introduce two related trading constraints into the model: a market drop-out constraint and a short-sale constraint. These constraints lead to new liquidation games, both in the mean-field setting and in the finite-player framework.
In each case, we show that the equilibria (for both the mean-field and the finite-player game) are characterized as solutions to a nonlinear higher-order integral equation with an endogenous terminal condition. We establish the existence and uniqueness of a solution to this integral equation, which in turn yields the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of the game.